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Abstract
We present a novel formulation of quantum game theory based on the Schmidt de-
composition, which has the merit that the entanglement of quantum strategies is
manifestly quantified. We apply this formulation to 2-player, 2-strategy symmetric
games and obtain a complete set of quantum Nash equilibria. Apart from those
available with the maximal entanglement, these quantum Nash equilibria are ex-
tensions of the Nash equilibria in classical game theory. The phase structure of the
equilibria is determined for all values of entanglement, and thereby the possibility
of resolving the dilemmas by entanglement in the game of Chicken, the Battle of
the Sexes, the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and the Stag Hunt, is examined. We find that
entanglement transforms these dilemmas with each other but cannot resolve them,
except in the Stag Hunt game where the dilemma can be alleviated to a certain
degree.
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1. Introduction
Quantum game theory, which is a theory of games with quantum strategies, has been
attracting much attention among quantum physicists and economists in recent years [1, 2]
(for a review, see [2, 3, 4]). There are basically two reasons for this. One is that quantum
game theory provides a general basis to treat the quantum information processing and
quantum communication in which plural actors try to achieve their objectives such as the
increase in communication efficiency and security [5, 6]. The other is that it offers an
extension for the existing game theory [7, 8], which is now a standard tool to analyze
social behaviors among competing groups, with the prospect that newly allowed quantum
strategies may overpower the conventional classical strategies, altering the known outcomes
in game theory [9, 10, 11]. An important novel element of quantum game theory is the
permission of correlation between the players which are usually forbidden in the standard
game theory. The correlation is not arbitrary: it is furnished by quantum entanglement
which is the key notion separating quantum and classical worlds, and gives a new dimension
to the conventional game theory allowing us to analyze the aspects (such as the altruism
[12, 13]) that are often prevalent in real situations and yet difficult to treat. In other
words, the quantum formulation of game theory seems to foster some sort of elements of
cooperative games in the context of standard non-cooperative game theory. As such, it
may, for instance, provide superior strategies for the players [9] or lead to resolution of the
so-called dilemmas in conventional ‘classical’ game theory [10, 14, 15].
Since the initial proposals of quantum game theory were presented, however, it has
been recognized [16] that the extended formulation suffers from several pitfalls that may
nullify the advantage of quantum strategies. One of them is the incompleteness problem of
the strategy space, that is, that one is just using a restricted class of strategies, rather than
the entire class of strategies available in the Hilbert space of quantum states determined
from the game. As a result, different and, at times, conflicting conclusions have been
drawn, depending on the class used in the analysis [17]. Although it is certainly possible to
devise special circumstances in which only a restricted class of strategies become available,
the required physical setting is untenable from operational viewpoints, because the actual
implementations of these strategies do not form a closed set [16]. Moreover, in general
these quantum strategies do not even form a convex space, and hence one may argue that
the system will not be robust against environmental disturbances. In contrast, the Hilbert
space of the entire strategies is a vector space which takes care of all dynamical changes
of strategies including those generated by the standard unitary operations in quantum
mechanics and possible reactions from the external perturbation [18].
A game theory based on the Hilbert space is not actually difficult to construct. Sup-
pose that the original classical game consists of two players each of whom can choose n
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different strategies. In the corresponding quantum game, each of the players can resort to
strategies given by quantum states belonging to the corresponding n-dimensional Hilbert
space Hn. The total space of states, containing all possible combinations of the strategies
adopted by the two players independently, ought to be given by the product space Hn⊗Hn
which is also a Hilbert space.
An actual scheme of realization of strategies belonging to the entire Hilbert space
has been presented in [19] for the case n = 2. There, the key concept is the trio of
correlation operators that form a dihedral algebra D2, which are the building blocks of
the correlation function that generates all possible joint states in the entire Hilbert space
from the individual states of the two players belonging to their own Hilbert spaces. The
realization has enabled us to disentangle the classically interpretable and purely quantum
components in the whole set of quantum strategies. It has later been applied to all possible
classes of 2-player, 2-strategy games [20] allowing for a full analysis of some of the games
discussed typically in classical game theory. One of the drawbacks of this scheme, however,
is the use of the specific operator algebra that is characteristic for 2-player, 2-strategy
games: its extension into general games will not be easy technically.
A question which has been asked persistently but has never been given a satisfactory
answer in the study of quantum game theory is whether the quantum strategies can really
be superior/advantageous than classical strategies, and if so, what is the physical origin of
the superiority. One may argue that, to a large extent, the superposition of states allowed
in quantum mechanics is analogous to classical probability distributions, and hence the
superposition of strategies admitted in quantum game theory will be simulated by clas-
sical strategies with probability distributions, i.e., ‘mixed strategies’, without yielding a
substantial difference between them. However, a clear distinction between the quantum
superposition and the classical probability distribution can be found in the nonlocal corre-
lation of quantum strategies, which is well known since the discovery of the EPR paradox
[21] and the Bell inequality [22]. This nonlocal correlation of two parties, the entangle-
ment, has become the key concept in the development of quantum information theory
[23], and it is quite natural to expect that entanglement plays a central role in realizing
the superiority of quantum strategies over the classical counterparts, if any. In fact, for
the specific type of games adopted directly from the settings where entanglement becomes
crucial, such as those used for the EPR paradox and the Bell inequality, the superiority of
quantum strategies is more or less manifest [5, 6]. In contrast, it is also possible to find an
example where the superiority is seen without entanglement [24]. The type of games for
which we address the question of superiority of quantum strategies in the present paper is
different from these: it is the type of 2-player, 2-strategy games which are standard tools
used frequently in classical game theory and have been extensively discussed in the context
3
of quantum game theory as well. In order to place our quantum game theory firmly in the
context of quantum information theory, it is essential to formulate the theory so that the
role of the entanglement becomes transparent and thereby examine the outcomes of the
games with respect to the entanglement attached.
That is exactly the subject we explore in this article. Namely, we write down the
strategies that span the entire Hilbert space with the explicit use of a measure of entan-
glement, and formulate the quantum game theory based on the scheme provided there.
The important technical element in this is the use of the Schmidt decomposition [25] for
describing joint strategies, which is available for games with two players. For actual anal-
ysis of quantum games, we shall restrict ourselves to the class of 2-strategy symmetric
games, which include familiar games in classical game theory such as the Chicken Game,
the Battle of the Sexes (BoS), the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) and the Stag Hunt (SH). We
find a complete set of solutions for quantum Nash equilibria (QNE) for the class of these
games, which we classify into four types according to their game theoretical properties.
These are natural extensions of the classical Nash equilibria except for the type which
arises only with the maximal entanglement and hence is genuinely quantum. We also
discuss the phase space structure of the QNE [17, 26, 27] with respect to the correlations
for the joint strategies. Using these results, we analyze the possibility of resolving the
dilemmas of the four games mentioned above. We find that, in our scheme of quantum
games, the dilemmas are somehow transformed with each other but will not be resolved
under any entanglement, except for the case of SH where the dilemma is mitigated to a
certain degree.
This paper is organized as follows. After the introductory account of quantum game
theory in our formulation based on the Schmidt decomposition in Section 2, we present in
Section 3 the complete set of solutions of QNE for symmetric games and thereby discuss
the phase structures formed under arbitrary correlations. We then study the problem of
dilemmas and their possible resolutions for each of the four games in Section 4. Section 5
is devoted to our conclusion and discussions. The Appendix contains the technical detail
on the QNE solutions and their classification used in the text.
2. Quantum Game in the Schmidt Decomposition
Our formulation of quantum game theory for 2-players follows from the idea that
each of the players, Alice and Bob, has an individual space of strategies given by the
respective Hilbert space HA and HB , and that the joint strategies of the two players are
represented by vectors (or pure states) in the total Hilbert space H given by the direct
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product H = HA⊗HB. The two players have their own payoff operators, A and B, which
are self-adjoint operators in H. When their joint strategy is given by a vector |Ψ〉 ∈ H,
these operators provide the payoffs ΠA and ΠB for the respective players by the expectation
values,
ΠA = 〈Ψ|A|Ψ〉, ΠB = 〈Ψ|B|Ψ〉. (2.1)
To express the joint strategies systematically, we recall the Schmidt decomposition
theorem [23, 25] which states that any bi-partite pure state |Ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB can be
expressed in terms of some orthonormal bases |ψk〉A ∈ HA, |ϕk〉B ∈ HB as
|Ψ〉 =
min[dA−1,dB−1]∑
k=0
λk |ψk〉A |ϕk〉B. (2.2)
Here, λk are positive coefficients fulfilling
∑
k λ
2
k = 1 and span over the range of the
smaller one of the dimensions among dA = dimHA and dB = dimHB of the constituent
Hilbert spaces. Note that the bases |ψk〉A, |ϕk〉B are also dependent on the state |Ψ〉 under
consideration. In furnishing a representation of the joint state, it is more convenient to use
some fixed, state-independent bases |i〉A, |j〉B for i = 0, 1, . . . , dA− 1, j = 0, 1, . . . , dB − 1.
Let UA(α), UB(β) be the unitary operators relating the set of state-dependent bases and
the set of state-independent bases as
|ψi(α)〉A = UA(α)|i〉A, |ϕj(β)〉B = UB(β)|j〉B, (2.3)
where α and β are parameters required to specify the unitary operators or, equivalently,
the state-dependent bases. Plugging (2.3) back into the decomposition (2.2), one realizes
that the quantum entanglement of the joint state resides only in the coefficients λk, not in
the parameters α and β which are entirely specified by the local operations performed by
the players.
The foregoing observation shows that, for each of the players, all one can do is to
choose the unitary operators UA(α), UB(β) for the change of the joint state |Ψ〉, and for this
reason, we call the local unitary operators UA(α), UB(β) as local strategies realized by the
players. It is important to recognize, however, that different choice of local strategies may
yield the same joint strategy |Ψ〉 when combined as (2.2). The separation of entanglement
from the local strategies which becomes available in the Schmidt decomposition is a clear
advantage of the present scheme of quantum game over other schemes which use different
representations of strategy vectors in which entanglement is ‘tangled’ with local operations
by the individual players. On the other hand, a common trait of quantum game theory
seen in all of these schemes is the appearance of the ‘external’ parameters which determine
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the amount of entanglement. In this respect, a quantum game provides an extension of a
classical game through the introduction of the entanglement (or correlation) parameters.
Due to the independence of the entanglement from the local operations, we may interpret
the third party specifying the external parameters as a referee acting independently of the
players.
For 2-qubit systems (dA = dB = 2), one may adopt the conventional vectorial repre-
sentation, |0〉 = (1, 0)T and |1〉 = (0, 1)T , and introduce the shorthand notation,
|i, j〉 = |i〉A|j〉B. (2.4)
Now, let us put λ0 = cos
γ
2
, λ1 = sin
γ
2
with an angle parameter 0 ≤ γ ≤ pi (which is always
possible by adjusting the overall sign of the state) for the generic 2-qubit entangled state
|Ψ〉 in the Schmidt decomposition (2.2). We then find
|Ψ(α, β; γ)〉 = UA(α)⊗ UB(β)
(
cos
γ
2
|0, 0〉+ sin γ
2
|1, 1〉
)
. (2.5)
To make the unitary operations explicit (ignoring the phase factors which are irrelevant in
physics), we adopt the Euler angle representation [28],
UA(α) = eiα3σ3/2eiα1σ2/2eiα2σ3/2, UB(β) = eiβ3σ3/2eiβ1σ2/2eiβ2σ3/2, (2.6)
where σa, a = 1, 2, 3 are the Pauli matrices. The Euler angles are supposed to be in the
ranges,
0 ≤ α1, β1 ≤ pi, 0 ≤ α2, α3, β2, β3 ≤ 2pi. (2.7)
We remark that the parametrization (2.6) is degenerate with respect to the represen-
tation of strategies, that is, it does not necessarily provide a one-to-one mapping for a
particular set of quantum states. To find a more convenient expression of the quantum
state and see where the mapping fails to be one-to-one, let us recombine the factors in the
unitary operators as
UA(α)⊗ UB(β) = VA ⊗ VB ei(α2+β2)X/2ei(α2−β2)Y/2 (2.8)
using
VA(α) = e
iα3σ3/2eiα1σ2/2, VB(β) = e
iβ3σ3/2eiβ1σ2/2, (2.9)
and
X =
1
2
(σ3 ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ σ3) , Y = 1
2
(σ3 ⊗ 1− 1⊗ σ3) . (2.10)
Since
Y |0, 0〉 = Y |1, 1〉 = 0, (2.11)
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|0〉A
|0〉B
⊗ γ
α
β
Figure 1. Our scheme of quantum game theory (see (2.5) and (2.16)). Starting
from the initial 2-qubit joint state |0, 0〉 = |0〉A ⊗ |0〉B, the referee first provides
entanglement to the pure state by tuning the parameter γ in the Schmidt coef-
ficients. Knowing the value of γ, the two players, Alice and Bob, choose their
local unitary operations with parameters α and β in order to optimize their payoffs
independently.
we learn that the state (2.5) becomes
|Ψ(α, β; γ)〉 = VA ⊗ VB ei(α2+β2)X/2
(
cos
γ
2
|0, 0〉+ sin γ
2
|1, 1〉
)
. (2.12)
Also, using
X |0, 0〉 = |0, 0〉, X |1, 1〉 = −|1, 1〉, (2.13)
we observe
cos
γ
2
|0, 0〉+ sin γ
2
|1, 1〉 = eiπ4 e−i π4X
(
cos
γ
2
|0, 0〉 − i sin γ
2
|1, 1〉
)
= ei
π
4 e−i
π
4XeiγD2/2 |0, 0〉,
(2.14)
where
D2 = σ2 ⊗ σ2. (2.15)
Removing the overall phase, and substituting (2.14) back into (2.12), we finally arrive
at the compact expression of the state,
|Ψ(α, β; γ)〉 = VA(α)⊗ VB(β) ei(φ−π/2)X/2eiγD2/2 |0, 0〉, (2.16)
with the phase sum,
φ = α2 + β2. (2.17)
This expression (2.16) provides a complete representation of the 2-qubit system, and fur-
nishes a basis for our analysis of quantum game theory (see Figure 1). Note that this
representation employs 2 + 2 = 4 local parameters in VA and VB plus φ (which is de-
termined by the local angles in system A and B by (2.17)) as well as the entanglement
angle γ. The total number of necessary parameters is therefore 6, which is exactly the
physical degrees of freedom of pure states in the 2-qubit system. This number 6 is one
degree less than the number of parameters used in (2.5) with (2.6), which implies that
we have an intrinsic degeneracy in describing the state by means of local operations, as
seen in the combination of the phase sum (2.17). This is the first source of the degeneracy
of the representation (2.5), which should be taken care of when we discuss the choice of
strategies of the players.
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To examine the content of the representation (2.16), we may explicitly expand it in
terms of the basis states,
|Ψ(α, β; γ)〉 = 1
2
[
eiξ+(Γ− cosχ+ + Γ+ cosχ−)|0, 0〉 − e−iξ+(Γ− cosχ+ − Γ+ cosχ−)|1, 1〉
−eiξ− (Γ− sinχ+ − Γ+ sinχ−)|0, 1〉 − e−iξ−(Γ− sinχ+ + Γ+ sinχ−)|1, 0〉
]
,
(2.18)
where
χ± =
α1 ± β1
2
, ξ± =
α3 ± β3
2
, Γ± = cos
γ
2
± e−iφ sin γ
2
. (2.19)
We then observe that the representation of the state (2.16) is not a one-to-one mapping
if Γ+ = 0 or Γ− = 0. These two cases occur when the two strategies of the players are
maximally entangled, i.e., when γ takes the value,
γ =
pi
2
, (2.20)
and simultaneously the phase sum takes one of the values,
φ = ppi, p = 0 or 1. (2.21)
In passing, we mention that the degeneracy in the representation occurring at p = 0 is the
one mentioned earlier [29] as a source of counterstrategy. Indeed, if Bob chooses his local
strategy as the complex conjugate of Alice’s local strategy, that is,
UB(β(α)) = U∗A(α), (2.22)
under p = 0 with (2.20), then the resulting state becomes
|Ψ(α, β(α); pi
2
)〉 = 1√
2
UA(α)⊗ U∗A(α) (|0, 0〉+ |1, 1〉) =
1√
2
(|0, 0〉+ |1, 1〉) . (2.23)
Thus the joint state becomes independent of the choice of the strategies adopted by the two
players under the particular commitment (2.22). This shows that the maximally entangled
case should be treated with special care in quantum game theory.
On the other hand, when we have γ = 0, the joint strategy (2.16) is decoupled (modulo
a phase) into the product
|Ψ(α, β; 0)〉 = |ψ(α)〉A · |ψ(β)〉B, (2.24)
of two local strategies of the players,
|ψ(α)〉A = VA(α)|0〉A, |ψ(β)〉B = VB(β)|0〉B. (2.25)
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We observe also from (2.18) that we can effectively work with φ ∈ [0, 2pi) which is half the
range of the original parameters (2.7).
In the present paper, among the generic 2-player, 2-strategy games, we are specifically
interested in the cases in which the payoff operators A, B commute with each other,
[A,B] = AB −BA = 0. (2.26)
We are then allowed to choose for our common basis {|i, j〉∣∣ i, j = 0, 1} in (2.4) by the basis
which diagonalizes A and B simultaneously,
〈i′, j′|A |i, j〉 = Aijδi′iδj′j , 〈i′, j′|B |i, j〉 = Bijδi′iδj′j . (2.27)
An important point is that the eigenvalues Aij and Bij can now be regarded as elements
of the payoff matrices of a classical game if we choose the fixed bases in (2.3) as the
eigenvectors of the two payoff operators in the quantum game. Indeed, if we follow the
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics that
xi = |A〈i|ψ(α)〉A|2, yj = |B〈j|ψ(β)〉B|2, (2.28)
represent the probability of Alice’s strategy |ψ(α)〉A being in the state |i〉A and the prob-
ability of Bob’s strategy |ψ(β)〉B in the state |j〉B , respectively, then from (2.24) we see
immediately that in the limit γ = 0 the payoffs become
ΠA(α, β; 0) =
∑
i,j
xiAij yj , ΠB(α, β; 0) =
∑
i,j
xiBij yj. (2.29)
These are precisely the payoffs of a classical game specified by the payoff matrices Aij
and Bij obtained when the players resort to the mixed strategies in classical game theory
by assigning probability distributions xi and yj to their choices of strategies (i, j). This
implies that at the ‘classical limit’ γ = 0 our quantum game reduces, in effect, to a classical
game defined by the payoff matrices whose entries are given by the eigenvalues of the payoff
operators.
To proceed further, for our later convenience we introduce the shorthand notation,
a00 =
1
4
∑
ij
Aij, a03 =
1
4
∑
ij
(−)jAij ,
a30 =
1
4
∑
ij
(−)iAij , a33 = 1
4
∑
ij
(−)i+jAij ,
(2.30)
and
r = tan
γ
2
, s =
a30
a33
, t =
a03
a33
. (2.31)
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With these shorthands (2.30), the payoff for Alice, for example, can be concisely written
as
ΠA(α, β; γ) = Π
pc
A (α, β; γ) + Π
in
A(α, β; γ) (2.32)
with
ΠpcA (α, β; γ) = a00 + a33 cosα1 cosβ1 + cos γ (a30 cosα1 + a03 cosβ1) (2.33)
and
ΠinA(α, β; γ) = a33 sin γ cosφ sinα1 sinβ1. (2.34)
The split of the payoff is done here so that in the classical limit γ = 0 the former ‘pseudo-
classical’ term ΠpcA survives and yields the classical payoff. In contrast, the latter term Π
in
A ,
which is proportional to the factor cosφ, represents the ‘interference’ effect of the local
strategies which arise under nonvanishing entanglement γ 6= 0. The split of the payoff
we discussed above has also been noted in a different quantization scheme [19,20], which
suggests that it is perhaps a common trait of quantum game theory which contains the
classical game as a special case.
Now we are in a position to define the notion of equilibria (stable strategies) in quan-
tum game theory, which is an analogue of the Nash equilibria (NE) in classical game theory.
For a given γ, we call the joint strategy (α⋆, β⋆) quantum Nash equilibrium (QNE) if it
satisfies
ΠA(α
⋆, β⋆; γ) ≥ ΠA(α, β⋆; γ), ΠB(α⋆, β⋆; γ) ≥ ΠB(α⋆, β; γ), (2.35)
for all α, β. The conditions are locally equivalent to
∂
∂αi
ΠA(α, β
⋆; γ)|α=α⋆ = 0, ∂
∂βi
ΠB(α
⋆, β; γ)|β=β⋆ = 0, (2.36)
and the convexity conditions
PA(α, β⋆; γ)|α=α⋆ ≤ 0, PB(α⋆, β; γ)|β=β⋆ ≤ 0, (2.37)
for the Hessian matrices,
PA(α, β; γ)ij = ∂αi∂αjΠA(α, β; γ), PB(α, β; γ)ij = ∂βi∂βjΠB(α, β; γ). (2.38)
An important class of games arise when the eigenvalues Aij , Bij (i, j = 0, 1) satisfy
Aij = Bji. (2.39)
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Those games with (2.39) possess an ‘symmetric’ (or ‘fair’) payoff assignment to the two
players,
ΠB(α, β; γ) = ΠA(β, α; γ), (2.40)
which is verified from (2.39). These are called symmetric1 games and are the main subject
of the present paper.
For symmetric quantum games, the conditions (2.36) are simplified into
sinα⋆1(a33 cosβ
⋆
1 + a30 cos γ) = a33 sin γ cosφ
⋆ cosα⋆1 sinβ
⋆
1 ,
sinβ⋆1(a33 cosα
⋆
1 + a30 cos γ) = a33 sin γ cosφ
⋆ cosβ⋆1 sinα
⋆
1,
a33 sin γ sinφ
⋆ sinα⋆1 sinβ
⋆
1 = 0.
(2.41)
The convexity conditions (2.37) for Alice can be put into conditions for the eigenvalues of
the Hessian matrix PA(α⋆, β⋆; γ),
Λ±(α⋆, β⋆; γ) =
1
2
{
− cosα⋆1(a33 cosβ⋆1 + a30 cos γ)− 2a33 sin γ cosφ⋆ sinα⋆1 sinβ⋆1
± | cosα⋆1|
√
(a33 cosβ⋆1 + a30 cos γ)
2 + (2a33 sin γ sinφ⋆ sinβ⋆1 )
2
}
≤ 0.
(2.42)
In the following we seek the solutions for both (2.36) and (2.37) based on the ex-
pressions (2.41) and (2.42). To exhaust all the solutions and reveal their game theoretical
properties, we first consider (2.41) for different classes of values of a30, a33 and γ, and
thereby find the solutions in each class, separately. We then reconstruct these solutions
from their characteristic properties as strategies. The first step is presented in the Ap-
pendix, and the second step is described in Sec. 3.
Now we address the issue of degeneracy in the phase sum φ, namely, that one cannot
determine the respective phases α⋆2 and β
⋆
2 uniquely from the value of φ
∗. This poses
an operational problem for the players, because it implies that they cannot adjust their
phases α⋆2 and β
⋆
2 without knowing the other’s choice, and such a share of knowledge on the
players’ actual choices is forbidden in non-cooperative games. As a possible resolution of
this problem, in the present paper we assume that each player is fair-minded and determine
their phases based on the parity division, that is, they share the same amount of phases
to form the required value of φ∗ by adjusting
α⋆2 = β
⋆
2 =
1
2
φ∗, (2.43)
1 They are called S-symmetric games in [20] to make a distinction from the other T -symmetric games.
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expecting the other player to do the same. This resolution is possible only for a phase
sum, not for a phase difference, which we shall encounter later in choosing the phases α⋆1
and β⋆1 in a particular solution available under the maximal entanglement.
One can argue that the fair-mindedness assumption is in fact consistent (or plausible)
with the symmetric games we are considering. To this end, let us consider the variations
of the payoffs,
δΠA(α, β; γ) = ΠA(α, β; γ)|φ+δ −ΠA(α, β; γ)|φ,
δΠB(α, β; γ) = ΠB(α, β; γ)|φ+δ −ΠB(α, β; γ)|φ,
(2.44)
under the change of the phase sum φ → φ + δ. Alice will not choose the value (2.43) if
her payoff increases δΠA > 0 at the expense of Bob’s payoff δΠB < 0, and Bob will do the
same if δΠB > 0 while δΠA < 0. This will not happen if
δΠA · δΠB ≥ 0, (2.45)
which implies that the two players share a common interest as long as the variation of φ
is concerned. In that case, they will not wish to change the phase from the value φ = φ∗
that optimizes the payoffs of the two players, and hence may well end up with choosing
the value (2.43).
In the general 2-player, 2-strategy games with commutative payoff operators, one finds
δΠA(α, β; γ) = a33 sin γ sinα sinβ [cos(φ+ δ)− cos(φ)],
δΠB(α, β; γ) = b33 sin γ sinα sinβ [cos(φ+ δ)− cos(φ)],
(2.46)
where b33 =
1
4
∑
ij(−)i+jBij is defined from the payoff operator B analogously to a33 in
(2.30). Accordingly, the inequality (2.45) becomes
a33b33 ≥ 0. (2.47)
The point is that, for symmetric games (2.39), one has b33 = a33 and hence the inequality
(2.47) holds trivially, assuring the consistency of the fair-mindedness assumption we have
adopted. This observation suggests in turn that, for non-symmetric games, the construc-
tion of quantum games requires some alternative machinery to determine the respective
phases of the players, without invoking the assumption used here.
3. Complete Set of QNE and their Phase Structures
For symmetric games, the conditions for QNE presented in the previous section can be
handled rather easily allowing us to obtain a complete set of solutions for the conditions.
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(kα, kβ) convexity conditions ΠA(α
⋆, β⋆; γ)
(0, 0) H+(γ) ≥ 0 P+++(γ)
(0, 1) H+(γ) ≤ 0, H−(γ) ≤ 0 P−+−(γ)
(1, 0) H+(γ) ≤ 0, H−(γ) ≤ 0 P−−−(γ)
(1, 1) H−(γ) ≥ 0 P+−+(γ)
Table I. The convexity conditions and Alice’s payoffs ΠA for the type I solution
specified by (kα, kβ) in (3.1). Bob’s payoffs ΠB are obtained from (2.40).
We provide the technical detail of the procedure for reaching the solutions in the Appendix,
and here we just mention that the solutions can be classified into four types from their
distinctive features as quantum strategies. The purpose of this section is to discuss these
features for each type of solutions, with a special emphasis on their phase structures,
that is, the relation between the type of solutions admitted and the correlations/payoffs
specifying the games.
3.1. Type I solutions: pseudoclassical pure strategies
The first class of the solutions are given by the following four possibilities:
α⋆1 = kαpi, β
⋆
1 = kβpi, kα, kβ = 0, 1, (3.1)
with arbitrary φ⋆. These strategies satisfy (2.41) for any symmetric (2-player, 2-strategy)
quantum games under arbitrary correlations γ. To examine when the four possibilities in
(3.1) fulfill the convexity conditions (2.42) and hence become QNE, we introduce
H±(γ) = a33 ± a30 cos γ, P±±±(γ) := a00 ± a33 ± (a30 ± a03) cos γ. (3.2)
The convexity conditions (2.42) and the expected payoffs for the type I solutions are
summarized in Table I.
The situation described in Table I is depicted in Figure 2 on the ‘phase-plane’ coordi-
nated by a30 cos γ and a33. On this plane, the family of correlations obtained by varying γ
for a given Aij (= Bji) is shown by a horizontal line segment with the right end (|a30|, a33)
and the left end (−|a30|, a33). One of these ends yields the classical limit γ = 0, where
the solutions reduces to those corresponding to the classical pure strategy NE. The other
end γ = pi also yields a classical game with the payoffs Ai¯j¯ (= Bj¯i¯) which is obtained by
converting the player’s strategies, i¯ := 1 − i, j¯ := 1 − j, from the original classical game.
From the viewpoint of correlations, these provide the two extreme cases where the joint
strategies become separable. On the other hand, at the midpoint of the line (0, a33) we
have γ = pi/2 and the strategies become maximally entangled. On account of the fact that
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a30 cos γ
a33H+(γ) = 0 H−(γ) = 0
(0,0),(1,1) coexist
(1,1) (0,0)
(0,1),(1,0) coexist
Figure 2. Phase diagram of the type I solutions (kα, kβ) in (3.1). The horizontal
line segments represent four different typical families of correlations in quantum
games obtained by varying γ. One of the two ends of a line segment, indicated by
a dot •, corresponds to the classical limit γ = 0, while the midpoint γ = pi/2 gives
the maximal entanglement to the joint strategies. The (left or right) position of
the classical limit γ = 0 on the line depends on the sign of a30 of the game.
at the two ends the solutions become, in effect, classical pure NE, we recognize that the
present QNE represent pseudoclassical pure strategies which are smoothly connected to
the classical pure NE when the correlations of the individual strategies disappear.
As seen in Figure 2, the phase-plane is divided into four domains depending on the
allowed combinations of the type I solutions labeled by (kα, kβ) in (3.1). Observe that
these domains are ‘anti-symmetric’ with respect to the a33-axis in the sense that the
interchange of the left and right domains implies the interchange 0↔ 1 in the labels of the
solutions (kα, kβ). Since the type I solutions are pseudoclassical, to classify the properties
of domains [20] we can use the standard classical game theoretical notions. One of them is
the Pareto optimality, which means that any other strategies cannot improve the payoffs
of both of the two players simultaneously from those obtained by the particular strategy
under consideration. If none of the QNE is Pareto optimal, a dilemma arises because the
players would then feel that they could have chosen the strategy that ensures better payoffs
for both of them. Adopting the name of the game, the Prisoners’ Dilemma, which typically
suffers from this problem, we say that the dilemma is a ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD)’ type in
this paper. Similarly, if the QNE is not unique, and if there is no particular reason to select
one out of these QNE, then the players face a different type of dilemmas, which we call
‘Battle of the Sexes (BoS)’ type, again, borrowing from the typical game possessing the
same property. Finally, even if the QNE found in the game is unique and Pareto optimal
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as well, there might still be a problem if the QNE is not favorable from the viewpoint of
risk. This happens when, for instance, the QNE is payoff dominant (i.e., it provides the
best payoffs for the players among other QNE) but not risk dominant [8] (i.e., it yields the
best ‘average’ payoff over the opponent’s possible strategies under consideration). When
this happens, unless the player cannot be sure about the opponent’s rational behavior,
there arises a dilemma of the type which we call ‘Stag Hunt (SH)’ in view of the same
situation observed in the SH game.
Restricting ourselves to the type I solutions for the moment, we may consider when
these dilemmas arise on the phase-plane. Let us first examine the domain satisfying
H+(γ) ≥ 0, H−(γ) ≤ 0, (3.3)
which admits only one of the type I solutions (kα, kβ) = (0, 0). Note that this solution is
not Pareto optimal if
F (γ) ≤ 0, (3.4)
where
F (γ) :=
P+++(γ)− P+−+(γ)
2
= (a30 + a03) cos γ (3.5)
measures the difference in Alice’s payoff between the two strategies, (0, 0) and (1, 1). If
(3.4) holds, one finds that the game suffers from a PD type dilemma already within the
type I solutions.
Analogously, since the domain specified by
H+(γ) ≤ 0, H−(γ) ≥ 0 (3.6)
admits only the solution (kα, kβ) = (1, 1), the Pareto optimality for this solution does not
hold if
F (γ) ≥ 0. (3.7)
We note that the Pareto optimality of QNE is, in general, difficult to confirm because for
that we need to examine the payoff for all other possible strategies, not just with QNE.
On the other hand, the domain given by
H+(γ) ≤ 0, H−(γ) ≤ 0, (3.8)
possesses two type I solutions, (kα, kβ) = (0, 1) and (1, 0). It is obvious that, if either
of the two solutions is preferable for one of the players, then by the symmetry (2.40) the
remaining solution is preferable for the opponent. Furthermore, if these two solutions are
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Dilemmas (kα, kβ) Conditions
PD (0, 0) H+(γ) ≥ 0, H−(γ) ≤ 0, F (γ) ≥ 0.
PD (1, 1) H+(γ) ≤ 0, H−(γ) ≥ 0, F (γ) ≤ 0.
BoS (0, 1) and (1, 0) H+(γ) ≤ 0, H−(γ) ≤ 0.
SH (0, 0) and (1, 1) H+(γ) ≥ 0, H−(γ) ≥ 0, G(γ) ≥ 0.
Table II. Domains on the phase-plane for the type I QNE classified according to
the dilemmas familiar in classical game theory.
equally preferable, the player cannot choose one of them uniquely. Thus, these solutions
come with a BoS type dilemma intrinsically.
Lastly, the domain defined by
H+(γ) ≥ 0, H−(γ) ≥ 0, (3.9)
has two type I solutions, (kα, kβ) = (0, 0) and (1, 1). Unless P+++(γ) = P+−+(γ) is
satisfied, the two players will choose the strategy which ensures a better payoff if the type
I solutions are the only QNE available. The payoff dominant solution can simultaneously
be risk dominant (if it is measured by using the standard average) provided that
G(γ) ≥ 0, (3.10)
where
G(γ) := F (γ)
(
P+++(γ) + P−+−(γ)
2
− P−−−(γ) + P+−+(γ)
2
)
= a30(a30 + a03) cos
2 γ.
(3.11)
The outcome of the foregoing analysis of the type I solutions is summarized in Table II.
3.2. Type II solutions: pseudoclassical mixed strategies
The type II solutions are given by
cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1 = s
r + (−)p
r − (−)p , φ
⋆ = ppi, p = 0, 1, (3.12)
with s and r defined in (2.31). The convexity condition (2.42) now reads
(−)pa33 ≥ 0, (3.13)
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a30 cos γ
a33
H−(γ) = 0H+(γ) = 0
|a30|−|a30|
p = 0
p = 1
Figure 3. Phase diagram of the type II solutions. The shaded area for a33 ≥ 0
has the solutions p = 0. Each of the two shaded areas for a33 ≤ 0 has the solutions
p = 1.
under which the solutions (3.12) are allowed for s and r fulfilling
∣∣∣∣sr + (−)
p
r − (−)p
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1. (3.14)
Using the same phase-plane employed for the type I solutions, one can see explicitly if
these type II solutions are admitted under the given payoffs and correlations (see Figure
3).
Under the type II solutions the players obtain the payoffs,
ΠA(α
⋆, β⋆; γ) = ΠB(α
⋆, β⋆; γ) =
1
a33
[
(a00a33 − a03a30) + (−)p(a233 − a03a30) sin γ
]
.
(3.15)
In the separable limits γ → 0, pi, the second term on the right hand side of (3.15) disap-
pears. The players then find the payoff
lim
γ→0,π
ΠA(α
⋆, β⋆; γ) = lim
γ→0,π
ΠB(α
⋆, β⋆; γ) =
A00A11 − A01A10
A00 − A01 − A10 + A11 , (3.16)
which is precisely the one obtained under the mixed NE of symmetric games in classical
game theory. We also observe from (3.12) that at the separable limits the condition (3.14)
simplifies into |s| ≤ 1. In view of (2.30), this condition is equivalent to
A00 ≥ A10 and A11 ≥ A01, or A00 ≤ A10 and A11 ≤ A01, (3.17)
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which are exactly the requirements for the classical mixed strategies to exist. These results
suggest that the type II solutions are actually the extended versions of the mixed strategies
in quantum game theory that arise with the correlation induced by the entanglement of
the individual strategies. The effect of the correlation is seen in the second term of the
payoff (3.15), which becomes maximal at the maximally entangled point γ = pi/2 unless
a233 = a30a03.
3.3. Type III solutions: special strategies
Let us consider the special case of the symmetric games in which we have
s = (−)σ, σ = 0, 1, and a33 < 0. (3.18)
Games whose payoff parameters obey these requirements admit infinitely many solutions in
addition to the two types of solutions discussed so far, and these are the Type III solutions
given by the strategies satisfying
cos γ cosα⋆1 cosβ
⋆
1 + (−)σ(cosα⋆1 + cosβ⋆1) + cos γ = 0, φ⋆ = pi. (3.19)
Note that, for a given γ, there are infinitely many combinations of (α∗1, β
∗
1) fulfilling the
first condition of (3.19) and that they must arise symmetrically under the interchange of
α∗1 and β
∗
1 . The distribution of these solutions are depicted in Figure 4 on the cosα
⋆
1-cosβ
⋆
1
plane. Observe that the difference of the payoffs at the symmetric pair of the solutions
reads
ΠA(α
⋆, β⋆; γ)− ΠA(β⋆, α⋆; γ) = − [ΠB(α⋆, β⋆; γ)− ΠB(β⋆, α⋆; γ)]
= (a30 − a03) cos γ (cosα⋆1 − cosβ⋆1).
(3.20)
Thus the same reasoning used in Sec. 3.1 for the BoS type dilemma applies here: to any
QNE there is a symmetric counterpart of QNE with which the players reach the dilemma
of the BoS. In the classical limit γ → 0, the first condition of (3.19) reduces to
(cosα⋆1 + (−)σ)(cosβ⋆1 + (−)σ) = 0, (3.21)
implying that the solutions become identical to the corresponding classical NE.
Let us examine the classical game theoretical meaning of the requirements (3.18)
assumed for the special strategies. For the case σ = 0, for instance, these requirements
become
A01 = A11, A10 > A00. (3.22)
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cosα⋆1
cosβ⋆1
1
−1
−1
1pi/2
pi/3
pi/4
pi/6
Figure 4. Given a γ, the type III solutions for σ = 0 distribute along the arc
determined by (3.19) whose edges are (cosα⋆1, cos β
⋆
1 ) = (−1, 1) and (1,−1) on the
cosα⋆1-cosβ
⋆
1 plane. Each number pi/2, pi/3, pi/4, and pi/6 refers to the value of γ
of its nearest upper right arc, respectively. Varying γ sweeps out the entire square,
which implies that any pair (α∗1, β
∗
1 ) becomes a special solution for some γ. By
reflecting each arc for cosα⋆1 + cos β
⋆
1 = 0, the arc of same γ for σ = 1 is obtained.
(The requirements for the case σ = 1, on the other hand, are obtained by the conversion
(i, j)→ (¯i, j¯) of (3.22).) Under these special payoffs (3.22), we find that there are indeed
infinitely many mixed NE given by the probability distributions of the strategies,
(p⋆A, p
⋆
B) = (0, x) and (x, 0), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (3.23)
where pA and pB stand for the probabilities of adopting the strategy labeled by ‘0’ by Alice
and Bob, respectively. The payoffs of the Nash equilibria (p⋆A, p
⋆
B) = (0, x), for instance,
are
ΠA(p
⋆
A = 0, p
⋆
B = x) = (1− x)A01 + xA10,
ΠB(p
⋆
A = 0, p
⋆
B = x) = A01,
(3.24)
showing that Bob’s payoff degenerates infinitely for x.
The payoffs of the other NE (p⋆A, p
⋆
B) = (x, 0) are obtained by the interchange of Π
⋆
A
and Π⋆B . From this one learns that
[ΠA(p
⋆
A = 0, p
⋆
B = x)− ΠA(p⋆A = x′, p⋆B = 0)]
×[ΠB(p⋆A = 0, p⋆B = x)− ΠB(p⋆A = x′, p⋆B = 0)] ≤ 0,
(3.25)
for x, x′ ∈ [0, 1]. The equality holds if either of
x = 0, x′ = 0, A01 = A10, (3.26)
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is satisfied. The inequality (3.25) implies that the special classical games fulfilling (3.22)
do have the BoS type dilemma as their quantum extensions do.
3.4. Type IV solutions: singular strategies
If the entanglement is maximal γ = pi/2, then irrespective of the payoffs of the game,
we have two distinct solutions for QNE, one of which is given by
α⋆1 + β
⋆
1 = pi, φ
⋆ = pi, (3.27)
for which the convexity condition reads a33 < 0. The payoffs realized by this singular
solution are
ΠA(α
⋆, β⋆; γ) = ΠB(α
⋆, β⋆; γ) = a00 − a33 = A01 + A10
2
. (3.28)
The payoffs for the players suggest that this solution is effectively equal to the classical
mixed strategies realizing the pure strategy (0, 1) and its conversion (1, 0) with equal
probabilities. This can be seen explicitly by observing that for the solution (3.27) the
quantum joint state (2.18) reads
|Ψ(α⋆, β⋆; pi
2
)〉 = − 1√
2
{
eiξ− |0, 1〉+ e−iξ− |1, 0〉} , (3.29)
consisting precisely of the two states |01〉 and |10〉.
Because of the degeneracy occurring at (3.27) (see (2.20) and (2.21)), this solution
poses the same operational problem as the one encountered earlier, i.e., the players find
it difficult to determine the phases α⋆1 and β
⋆
1 from the value of their sum. Since the
solutions (3.27) pass a criterion for α⋆1 + β
⋆
1 similar to (2.45), we shall again adopt the
same fair-mindedness assumption for all variables of the players, that is, they resolve the
problem by choosing
α⋆1 = β
⋆
1 =
pi
2
, α⋆2 = β
⋆
2 =
pi
2
, (3.30)
expecting the equal share with the other.
Another solution admitted at γ = pi/2 is
α⋆1 − β⋆1 = 0, φ⋆ = 0, (3.31)
for a33 > 0. Again, we have the degeneracy problem, but now in a way which is worse
than the previous case, because the condition for α⋆1 and β
⋆
1 is now difference, not the sum,
for which the fair-mindedness assumption is of no use. It seems for us that this problem
cannot be resolved on reasonable grounds as long as the two players act independently,
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and for this reason we abandon the solution (3.31) as a possible strategy to resolve the
dilemmas in this paper.
4. Dilemmas in the Chicken Game, BoS, PD and SH
The discussion in the preceding section shows that players can have various QNE
strategies to choose under a given symmetric pair of payoff operators and a correlation γ.
This leads us to the question whether or not the players can choose their strategy uniquely
among the many QNE available. More generally, given a game we are interested in the
phase structures of the type of dilemmas appearing there, and thereby ask if it is possible
to tune the correlation γ such that the original dilemma in the classical game (γ = 0)
disappears. Below, we shall investigate this by the four typical examples of games, the
Chicken Game, BoS, PD and SH.
Before we start our analysis, we recall an important notion which guides the players
in choosing their strategies (and has been implicitly used in the preceding sections), i.e.,
the payoff-dominance principle [8] of game theory which states that the players make their
decisions in order to maximize their own payoffs. It is thus instrumental to consider the
payoff-difference between two QNE strategies for each of the players,
∆Πµ,νA (γ) = ΠA(α
µ⋆, βµ⋆; γ)−ΠA(αν⋆, βν⋆; γ),
∆Πµ,νB (γ) = ΠB(α
µ⋆, βµ⋆; γ)− ΠB(αν⋆, βν⋆; γ),
(4.1)
where µ, ν label different QNE. In our present case, these are one of the set
{I(i,j), IIp, III, IV} of labels corresponding to the types of the solutions mentioned ear-
lier. Evaluation of the payoff-difference for all possible pairs of QNE allowed by the given
payoff operators and γ will provide a full list of QNE, and from this the phase structure
of the games will be examined. For instance, if there exists a single QNE which yields the
best payoffs for both players, then obviously the players are happy to choose it and there
does not arise a dilemma. On the other hand, if the entanglement is maximal γ = pi/2, a
BoS type dilemma necessarily arises because the type I, II, and IV solutions appear there
with a degeneracy of the payoffs.
4.1. Chicken Game
Let us first consider a symmetric game with payoffs satisfying
A10 > A00 > A01 > A11. (4.2)
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a30 cos γ
a33
(0,0),(1,1) coexist
(1,1) (0,0)
(0,1),(1,0) coexist
p = 0
p = 1
1−1 O cos γ
Payoffs
Π
I(0,1)
A
Π
I(1,0)
A
Π
IIp
A
Figure 5. (Left) The phase diagram of the Chicken Game whose correlation family
is shown by the two horizontal line segments possessing the opposite positions of
the classical limit. The two lines are contained in the region where there are two
type I solutions (0, 1), (1, 0) and the type II solutions with p = 1. (Right) The
payoffs of the three QNE solutions as functions of correlation γ. The differences of
the line segment shapes refer to those of the types of the payoffs.
These conditions define the Chicken Game and are equivalent to
a33 < 0, |s| < 1, t < −1. (4.3)
From (4.3), we find H±(γ) < 0 for all γ, which is (3.8) and hence there appear two type I
solutions, (0, 1) and (1, 0). The existence of the type II solution with p = 1 is seen in Figure
3, while the type III solutions are not allowed from (4.3). The distribution of the QNE
in the Chicken Game is illustrated in Figure 5. As we have seen in the previous section,
as long as the type I solutions are concerned, for (3.8) we encounter a BoS type dilemma.
This dilemma can be resolved if the payoffs (3.15) of the type II solutions are superior to
those of the type I solution. To examine this possibility, we note that the type II solutions
are invariant under the interchange of α and β, and that from (2.40) it is sufficient to
compare one of the type I solutions to the type II solutions. Thus, for definiteness, in the
following discussion we only consider (0, 1) for the type I solution.
The differences in the payoffs (4.1) between the type I and the type II solutions are
∆Π
I(0,1),II1
A (γ) = ∆Π
I(1,0),II1
B (γ) = a33(s+ 1)(t− 1)
(
r − uv−1) r − 1
r2 + 1
,
∆Π
I(0,1),II1
B (γ) = ∆Π
I(1,0),II1
A (γ) = a33(s− 1)(t+ 1)
(
r − u−1v) r − 1
r2 + 1
,
(4.4)
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with
u =
s− 1
s+ 1
and v =
t− 1
t+ 1
. (4.5)
From (4.3) we observe
∆Π
I(0,1),II1
A ·∆Π
I(1,0),II1
A ≤ 0 (4.6)
for all r ≥ 0, showing that none of the solutions is superior to the rest in their payoffs.
The payoffs which Alice receives under the QNE are shown in Figure 5, where we observe
that, except at the maximally entangled point γ = pi/2, Alice receives the best QNE at
either one of the type I solutions (kα, kβ) = (0, 1), (1, 0) depending on the sign of cos γ.
By using the symmetry, Bob receives the best QNE at the other of the type I solution.
Since the best solutions for Alice and Bob are different, we conclude that the dilemma of
the Chicken Game cannot be resolved for any correlation γ even if the full set of QNE are
taken into account.
4.2. Battle of the Sexes
The Battle of the Sexes game is defined by the payoffs with the conditions Aij = Bj¯i¯
supplemented by
A00 > A11 > A01 = A10. (4.7)
This game is not a symmetric game but belongs to another type of games which has a dual
structure to the symmetric games we are considering, and because of this, they can be
analyzed analogously. The trick we use for this is the duality transformation [20], which
interchanges the types of the game, bringing the BoS game to the corresponding symmetric
version of BoS. The transformed BoS then has the payoffs fulfilling (2.39) and
A¯10 > A¯01 > A¯11 = A¯00, (4.8)
with A¯ij being the payoffs after the transformation for which the constraints read
a¯33 < 0, 0 < s¯ < 1, s¯+ t¯ = 0. (4.9)
Since the first and second inequalities in (4.9) are ensured from (4.3), the distribution
of the solutions is similar to that of the Chicken Game (see Figure 6). The type II solutions
exist and the players can still employ the fair-mindedness assumption (2.43) on account of
the fact that the relative phase φ and a33 are invariant under the duality transformation.
On the other hand, if the type IV solution (3.27) derives from the solution (3.31) appearing
before the transformation, then it suffers from an operational problem inherent to (3.31).
However, as far as the resolution of dilemma is concerned, we can count out the type IV
23
a30 cos γ
a33
(0,0),(1,1) coexist
(1,1) (0,0)
(0,1),(1,0) coexist
p = 0
p = 1
1−1 O cos γ
Payoffs
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I(0,1)
A
Π
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Figure 6. (Left) The phase diagram of the BoS Game whose correlation family
is shown by the line segment near the bottom. One the line appear two type I
solutions (0, 1), (1, 0) and the type II solution with p = 0. (Right) The payoffs of
the solutions for various correlations γ.
solutions altogether without affecting the analysis of Sec. 4.1. to conclude that for any γ
the type II solution cannot yield the best payoff for Alice and Bob. It follows that the BoS
dilemma in the game cannot be resolved by furnishing correlations in the present scheme
of quantum game.
4.3. Prisoners’ Dilemma
The PD game is a symmetric game which has the payoffs obeying
A10 > A00 > A11 > A01 and 2A00 > A01 + A10 > 2A11. (4.10)
To analyze the game, we first note that a33 > 0 implies
s < −1 and s+ t > 2, (4.11)
while a33 < 0 implies
s > 1 and s+ t < −2. (4.12)
In both cases, at the classical limit γ = 0 we have
H+(0) = a33(1 + s) < 0 and H−(0) = a33(1− s) > 0, (4.13)
and, hence, the only allowed QNE is the type I solution (kα, kβ) = (1, 1). Besides, since
F (0) = a30 + a03 = a33(s+ t) > 0, (4.14)
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a30 cos γ
a33
(0,0),(1,1) coexist
(1,1) (0,0)
(0,1),(1,0) coexist
p = 0
p = 1
Figure 7. The phase diagram of the PD game. The upper horizontal line segment
represents the correlation family for (4.11), while the lower one represents the
family for (4.12).
we see that the QNE is not Pareto optimal, confirming that at the classical limit the PD
game with (4.10) has a PD type dilemma as it should.
Now, let us consider the generic case of correlations γ. First, for the case (4.11) we
find that the existence condition of the type II solution (3.14) cannot have a solution for
any r = tan γ/2. The allowed type I solutions vary depending on the values of γ, as seen
from the correlation family which is shown by the upper line segment in Figure 7. Since the
payoffs of the type I solutions degenerate, the BoS type dilemma occurs at r = 1. In more
detail, for 0 ≤ r ≤ u− 12 with u defined in (4.5), the only QNE is given by (kα, kβ) = (1, 1).
There, (3.7) becomes
F (γ) = a33(s+ t) cos γ > 0, (4.15)
implying that the QNE is not Pareto optimal. For u−
1
2 ≤ r ≤ u 12 , the allowed QNE are
(kα, kβ) = (0, 0), (1, 1). There, (3.11) becomes
G(γ) = a230s(s+ t) cos
2 γ ≤ 0, (4.16)
implying that the game has a SH type dilemma except at r = 1 (γ = pi/2). For u
1
2 < r, the
only QNE is (kα, kβ) = (0, 0), and we can conclude by an analogous argument that this
is not Pareto optimal. Summarizing the above, we learn that the dilemma is not resolved
for a PD game with (4.11) .
In contrast, a PD game with Eq.(4.12) possesses a different phase structure (see the
lower segment of line in Figure 7). The type II solution labeled by p = 1 exists for
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Figure 8. (Left) Payoffs of the QNE in the PD game for the case (4.11). (Right)
Payoffs of the PD game for the case (4.12). The type II solutions are not Pareto
optimal for any γ, since they are surpassed in the payoffs by the other strategies
(P−±−, or P+±+ in the some regions of γ where they are not QNE).
u < r < u−1. In addition, the type IV solutions arises at r = 1, where a BoS type
dilemma occurs because of the degeneracies of the solutions. The phase transition of the
type I solutions occurs as follows: for 0 ≤ r < u 12 , it is (kα, kβ) = (1, 1) for which (4.15)
holds, indicating that the QNE is not Pareto optimal. For u
1
2 ≤ r ≤ u− 12 , the QNE are
(kα, kβ) = (0, 1) and (1, 0) under which a BoS type dilemma occurs. For u
1
2 < r, the QNE
is (kα, kβ) = (0, 0) which is not Pareto optimal. The above results show that the dilemma
of the game can be resolved only if the payoffs of the type II solutions are superior to those
of the type I solutions and if the type II solutions are Pareto optimal among all possible
strategies.
Let us study the possibility of the resolution of the dilemma first for the domain
u < r < u
1
2 . The difference of the payoffs between the type I solution (kα, kβ) = (0, 0)
(which is not the QNE in this domain) and the type II solution is
∆Π
I(0,0),II1
A = ∆Π
I(0,0),II1
B = a33(s− 1)(t− 1)(r − u−1)(r − v−1)(r2 + 1)−1 > 0. (4.17)
This inequality implies that the type II solution is not Pareto optimal. For u
1
2 ≤ r ≤ u− 12 ,
on the other hand, we have
a33(s+ 1)(t− 1) > 0, a33(s− 1)(t+ 1) > 0 and u 12 < u−1v < 1. (4.18)
It follows that ∆ΠI,IIA ∆Π
I,II
B ≤ 0, that is, the dilemma still remains. Finally, for u−
1
2 < r <
u−1, we can use the discussion for the case u < r < u
1
2 to deduce that, again, the dilemma
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is not resolved. Combining the result obtained for the case (4.11), we conclude that the
dilemma in the PD game cannot be resolved by quantization in our scheme.
4.4. Stag Hunt
The SH is a symmetric game with payoffs satisfying
A00 > A10 ≥ A11 > A01, and A10 +A11 > A00 +A01. (4.19)
These constraints are equivalent to
a33 > 0, 0 > s ≥ −1, t > 1. (4.20)
Note first that since H±(γ) ≥ 0 for all γ, the type I solutions (kα, kβ) = (0, 0), (1, 1) coexist
for all r. Since the inequality (3.11) is not satisfied (except for r = 1), we see that, in
general, these type I solutions have a SH type dilemma. The type II solution p = 0 is
admitted for r ≥ −u or −u−1 ≥ r ≥ 0.
Let us examine the question whether the classical SH type dilemma can be resolved
by quantization. For −u−1 < r < 1 or 1 < r < −u, only type I solutions (which have the
SH dilemma for all r) are admitted and the dilemma is not resolved. For r = 1, the BoS
type dilemma arises due to the degeneracies of the payoffs of the type I solutions. This
leaves only the correlations in the region,
−u−1 ≥ r ≥ 0. (4.21)
Here, we have P+++ > P+−+ and thus both players prefer the type I solution (kα, kβ) =
(0, 0) to (kα, kβ) = (1, 1). Also, since (4.17) holds in this region, both players prefer the
type I solution (kα, kβ) = (0, 0) to the type II solution. Hence, the QNE (kα, kβ) = (0, 0)
is payoff dominant (see Figure 9).
In order to examine the risk dominance, we introduce the effective payoff table for
given γ in Table III with
Q± = a00 − a33sr + 1
r − 1
tr2 ± 2r − t
r2 + 1
R± = a00 − a33 r + 1
r − 1
(s2 ∓ s± t)r2 ∓ 2tr − (s2 ± s∓ t)
r2 + 1
.
(4.22)
Assuming that Bob adopts his three classes of the equilibria strategies with equal proba-
bilities, the average payoff given to Alice for the choice kα = 0 is
〈ΠA〉kα=0 =
1
3
(P+++ + P−+− +Q−). (4.23)
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Strategy Bob kβ = 0 Bob kβ = 1 Bob Type II
Alice kα = 0 (P+++, P+++) (P−+−, P−−−) (Q−, R+)
Alice kα = 1 (P−−−, P−+−) (P+−+, P+−+) (Q+, R−)
Alice Type II (R+, Q−) (R−, Q+) (ΠA,ΠB)
Table III. Effective payoffs in a symmetric game, where Qst± and Q
ts
± are given in
(4.22) and ΠA and ΠB are the payoffs of the type II solutions.
Likewise, if Alice chooses kα = 1, the average payoff she receives is
〈ΠA〉kα=1 =
1
3
(P−−− + P+−+ +Q+), (4.24)
and if Alice chooses the type II solution, the average payoff reads
〈ΠA〉Type II = 1
3
(R+ +R− +ΠA). (4.25)
The risk dominance of the (0, 0) solution with respect to the other solution (1, 1)
requires
〈ΠA〉kα=0 − 〈ΠA〉kα=1 = −
4a33s
3
r + 1
r − 1
(
1− 3r
r2 + 1
)
> 0, (4.26)
in addition to (4.21). One can see readily that this is ensured for r with
3−√5
2
< r ≤ −u−1, (4.27)
which requires − 1√
5
< s < 0. Indeed, combining (4.20) and (4.21), one finds that (4.26)
turns into 3−
√
5
2 < r <
3+
√
5
2 and hence, if
3−
√
5
2 < −u−1 (or − 1√5 < s < 0), the inequality
(4.27) never holds. Conversely, (4.27) satisfies (4.26) and (4.21), which guarantees the
existence of the type II solution.
On the other hand, the risk dominance of the (0, 0) solution with respect to the type
II solutions demands
〈ΠA〉kα=0 − 〈ΠA〉TypeII =
2a33(s− 1)
3
(r + u−1)(sr2 + 2− s)
(r2 + 1)(r − 1) > 0, (4.28)
in addition to (4.21). This, however, cannot be fulfilled, as one can see by using an
argument analogous to the one used above.
To summarize, in the classical limit γ = 0 the average payoffs have the relations,
〈ΠA〉kα=0 < 〈ΠA〉kα=1, 〈ΠA〉kα=0 < 〈ΠA〉TypeII, (4.29)
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a30 cos γ
a33
(0,0),(1,1) coexist
(1,1) (0,0)
(0,1),(1,0) coexist
p = 0
p = 1
1−1 O cos γ
Payoffs
Π
I(0,0)
A
Π
I(1,1)
A
Π
IIp
A
Figure 9. (Left) The phase diagram of the SH game. The horizontal line segment
in the upper part represents the correlation family of the game. (Right) The payoffs
of the QNE in the family.
while, under appropriate correlations, we can have
〈ΠA〉kα=1 < 〈ΠA〉kα=0 < 〈ΠA〉TypeII. (4.30)
We thus reach the conclusion that, although the dilemma in the SH game cannot be
resolved completely, it can be weakened by alleviating the situation to a certain extent.
The analysis in the region r > −u can be made similarly, yielding a similar conclusion.
Alternatively, for the examination of the risk dominance, one may consider the aver-
ages of payoffs taken over all possible quantum strategies of the opponent, that is,
〈ΠA〉kα=0 =
∫ 2π
0
dβ2
∫ π
0
dβ1ΠA(α
I⋆, β; γ)∫ 2π
0
dβ2
∫ π
0
dβ1
,
〈ΠA〉kα=1 =
∫ 2π
0
dβ2
∫ π
0
dβ1ΠA(α
I⋆, β; γ)∫ 2π
0
dβ2
∫ π
0
dβ1
,
〈ΠA〉Type II =
∫ 2π
0
dβ2
∫ π
0
dβ1ΠA(α
II⋆, β; γ)∫ 2π
0
dβ2
∫ π
0
dβ1
.
(4.31)
This time, the payoff differences become simpler:
〈ΠA〉kα=0 − 〈ΠA〉kα=1 = 2a33s
1− r2
1 + r2
,
〈ΠA〉kα=0 − 〈ΠA〉TypeII = a33s(s− 1)
(r + 1)(r + u−1)
r2 + 1
.
(4.32)
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However, from (4.20) we learn that the ordering in the average payoffs for the correlations
(4.21) remains unchanged from the classical case (4.29).
5. Conclusion and Discussions
In this article, we have presented a new formulation of quantum game theory for
2-players. In particular, we have provided a salutary scheme for symmetric games with
2-strategies and thereby analyzed the outcomes of the games in detail. Our formulation is
based on the Schmidt decomposition of two partite quantum states, which is an alternative
to the one proposed recently in [19] and is readily extendable to n-strategy games. Techni-
cally, the difference between the two formulations lies in the operator ordering of correlation
and individual local unitary transformations required to specify the joint strategy.
As in the previous formulation, the present formulation is intended to accommodate
all possible strategies realized in the Hilbert space (which is the state space of quantum
theory) to remedy the defect found in many of the formulations of quantum game theory
proposed earlier. In our scheme of quantizing a classical game, we have the set of correlation
parameters γ which are determined independently of the strategies of the players. Since
the limit γ → 0 restores the original classical game, we see that γ provides an extension of
a classical game yielding a γ-deformed family of games. On account of the independence
of the parameters γ from the players choice, one may think of a third party, or a ‘referee’,
who tunes γ in the game theoretic settings. It is worth mentioning that in our scheme
of quantum game theory the payoff splits into a pseudo-classical component and the rest,
such that the former amounts to the payoff of the γ-deformed family of games while the
latter to the extra factor allowed only under the presence of interference and correlation.
The present formulation turns out to be quite convenient also in analyzing the QNE,
that is, the stable strategies the players would choose in quantum game theory. Indeed, we
are able to find a complete set of solutions for the equilibria, which are classified into four
types in the text, among which three are γ-deformed versions of classical Nash equilibria,
and the other one is admitted only with the maximal entanglement and hence cannot be
found in classical games. Besides the elements that determine the original classical game
from which the quantum game is defined, the existence of these equilibria depends strongly
on the correlations γ given. The analysis of the dependence has allowed us to obtain a
clear picture of the phase structure of the QNE in the game, which can be convoluted
when some of the four types of solutions coexist. We mention that the phase structure we
found shares some properties similar to those obtained by other schemes [17, 20]. Since
our scheme deals with the whole Hilbert space, one may argue that this similarity comes
as a partial manifestation of the full phase structure obtained by our scheme.
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One of the interests in game theory lies in learning the mechanism underlying the
appearance of dilemmas and their possible resolutions. In this respect, we need to address
the question if the quantization (i.e., the extension by introducing quantum correlations)
of a classical game can provide a resolution of the dilemma, which has actually been the
main thrust in the investigation of quantum game theory since its inception [9, 10, 14]. To
find the answer in our scheme of quantum game, we have investigated the four examples
of 2-player, 2-stratey games, the Chicken Game, the (S-symmetric version of) Battle of
the Sexes, the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and the Stug Hunt, all of which are plagued with
dilemmas. The outcome is somewhat discouraging, however. Namely, we have seen that
the players of none of the four games find a resolution of the dilemma, except for the Stug
Hunt game where the dilemma can be mitigated to some extent within the analysis done
with the assumptions made there. We note that these results are obtained with the full
set of QNE, which now include the new types of equilibria absent in classical game theory.
Although this does not exclude the possibility of resolution of dilemmas in other games by
quantization, it certainly suggests the generic difficulty which will arise in quantum game
theory formulated in our scheme.
These results in the resolutions of the dilemmas are clearly different from those found
in other literatures [10, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20]. This originates in the differences in the quan-
tization scheme, that is, in the treatment of local strategies of the players and in the
presence/absence of (artificial) restrictions of the state space. For example, consider the
quantization of the Battle of the Sexes, where the appearance of coexisting QNE leads to
the typical dilemma for any values of correlation γ. Assume that a restriction of the state
space does not affect the dilemma at the classical γ = 0 limit (to the authors’ knowledge,
all the quantization schemes proposed so far adopt this assumption). If one can devise a
restriction such that it removes one of the coexisting QNE for some γ and simultaneously
ensures the criterion of the Pareto optimality for the remaining QNE in the restricted state
space, then the game will no longer suffer from any dilemma at that value of γ. This is
in fact a standard mechanism of resolving the dilemma in different quantization schemes
at the cost of introducing artificial restrictions rendering the space of strategies untenable
from operational viewpoints [16].
Finally, we mention the obvious merit of the Schmidt decomposition in our formula-
tion, that is, that the correlation between the strategies of the individual players is ex-
pressed in terms of a variable that directly specifies the degree of quantum entanglement.
This implies that the quantum game theory in our formulation is ready to be positioned
properly in the field of quantum information. In fact, it is possible to extend the scope of
the games by considering, for instance, the cases where the two payoff operators do not
commute (i.e. by eliminating our assumption (2.26)), or the cases where the game consists
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of multiple rounds of subgames with different payoff operators. These yield a setup of
games similar to the one given by the CHSH game [30, 31], where the quantum nonlocality
will be seen to affect the outcome of the game directly. This would become a focus of
attention in future researches, along with the technical extension of the theory beyond the
class of quantum games considered here.
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Nos. 13135206, 16540354 and 18540384 of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science,
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Appendix. Quantum Nash Equilibria and their Classification
In this appendix, we provide a complete set of solutions for the extremal condition
(2.41) and the convexity condition (2.42) for QNE in symmetric quantum games. Our
strategy to find the complete set is as follows: first, we classify the symmetric games into
four types (I) - (IV) depending on whether a33 and/or a30 vanish or not. Secondly, in
each class, we obtain the solutions for the conditions separately for the separable states
(γ = 0, pi), the generic (nonmaximal) entangled states, and the maximally entangled states
(γ = pi/2). The criterion for the finer classification in each class of the states derives from
the different ways to meet the third equation in (2.41), and this procedure exhausts all
possibilities for the strategies to become QNE. Finally, we regroup the solutions to four
new types which are convenient for our discussions in the text.
(I) a33 = 0 and a30 = 0
In this case, both the conditions (2.41) and (2.42) are trivially satisfied, and any set
of values of α1, β1, and φ provides a QNE for all correlations γ.
(II) a33 = 0 and a30 6= 0
Eq.(2.41) is then simplified as
cos γ sinα⋆1 = cos γ sinβ
⋆
1 = 0. (A.1)
When the state is separable, γ = cpi, c = 0, 1, we have the solutions
(α⋆1, β
⋆
1) = (kα, kβ)pi, kα, kβ = 0, 1. (A.2)
Eq.(2.37) shows that the solutions for (2.41) are provided by (kα, kβ, c) = (0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)
for a30 > 0 and (kα, kβ, c) = (1, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) for a30 < 0. The convexity condition (2.42) is
then examined to find that (kα, kβ) = (0, 0) becomes QNE for a30 cos γ > 0 and (kα, kβ) =
(1, 1) becomes QNE for a30 cos γ < 0. At γ = pi/2, both the extremal condition and the
convexity conditions are fulfilled trivially, and hence any set of values of α1, β1, and φ
gives a QNE.
(III) a33 6= 0 and a30 = 0
(III-1) Separable states:
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Eq.(2.41) becomes
sinα⋆1 cosβ
⋆
1 = cosα
⋆
1 sinβ
⋆
1 = 0, (A.3)
allowing for two classes of solutions. One is given by (A.2) for which the convexity condition
reads
(−)kα+kβa33 ≥ 0. (A.4)
The other is α⋆1 = β
⋆
1 = pi/2 for which no further condition arises from the convexity
condition.
(III-2) Generic entangled states:
Eq.(2.41) becomes
sinα⋆1 cosβ
⋆
1 = sin γ cosφ
⋆ cosα⋆1 sinβ
⋆
1 ,
cosα⋆1 sinβ
⋆
1 = sin γ cosφ
⋆ sinα⋆1 cosβ
⋆
1 ,
sinφ⋆ sinα⋆1 sinβ
⋆
1 = 0.
(A.5)
(i) For φ⋆ = ppi with p = 0, 1, there are two classes of solutions. One is (A.2) for which the
convexity condition is given by (A.4). The other is α⋆1 = β
⋆
1 = pi/2 for which the convexity
condition is (−)pa33 ≥ 0.
(ii) For φ 6= ppi, the solutions are given by (A.2) under the convexity condition (A.4).
(III-3) Maximally entangled states:
Eq.(2.41) becomes
cosφ⋆ cosα⋆1 sinβ
⋆
1 = sinα
⋆
1 cosβ
⋆
1 ,
cosφ⋆ cosβ⋆1 sinα
⋆
1 = sinβ
⋆
1 cosα
⋆
1,
sinφ⋆ sinα⋆1 sinβ
⋆
1 = 0.
(A.6)
(i) For φ⋆ = ppi, the first and second equations of (A.6) reduce to
sin(α⋆1 − (−)pβ⋆1 ) = 0, (A.7)
which provides the solutions,
α⋆1 = (−)pβ⋆1 + q pi, q = 0, 1, (A.8)
where the values of q are required to obey (−)qa33 > 0 by the convexity condition. From
the range of the parameters α⋆1, β
⋆
1 , the combinations of (p, q) are restricted to (p, q) =
(0, 0), (1, 1).
34
(ii) For φ 6= ppi, (A.2) gives the solution and the convexity condition reads (A.4).
(IV) a33 6= 0 and a30 6= 0
(IV-1) Separable states:
Eq. (2.41) becomes
sinα⋆1 [cosβ
⋆
1 + (−)cs] = 0,
sinβ⋆1 [cosα
⋆
1 + (−)cs] = 0,
(A.9)
and the convexity conditions are
a33 cosα
⋆
1 [cosβ
⋆
1 + (−)cs] ≥ 0,
a33 cosβ
⋆
1 [cosα
⋆
1 + (−)cs] ≥ 0.
(A.10)
(i) If α⋆1 = kαpi and s = (−)c+kα+1, (A.9) is satisfied. From the convexity conditions, we
find that if a33 > 0, then kα = 0 and β
⋆
1 = 0, or kα = 1 and β
⋆
1 = pi. If a33 < 0, on the
other hand, no restriction for β⋆1 arises.
(ii) If α⋆1 = kαpi and s 6= (−)c+kα+1, then β⋆1 = kβpi. These four solutions are subject to
(A.10).
(iii) If α⋆1 6= kαpi, from the first of (A.9) we have cosβ⋆1 = (−)c+1s. This requires |s| ≤ 1.
The second of (A.9) implies either s = (−)σ with σ = 0, 1 or cosα⋆1 = (−)c+1s. For the
former case, the convexity conditions yield (−)c+σ = 1 and a33 < 0, or (−)c+σ = −1 and
a33 < 0. For the latter case with s 6= (−)σ, the convexity conditions are always fulfilled.
(IV-2) Generic entangled states:
(i) Suppose first that φ⋆ = ppi. One class of solutions available is then (A.2). The convexity
conditions are those given in Table I. If (A.2) is not fulfilled, then we can derive
cos γ cosα⋆1 cosβ
⋆
1 + s(cosα
⋆
1 + cosβ
⋆
1 ) + s
2 cos γ = 0, (A.11)
from (2.41) by multiplying each side of the first equation by the same side of the second
equation. Furthermore, if
cosβ⋆1 6= 0 and cosα⋆1 + s cos γ 6= 0 (A.12)
holds, then each side of the first equation of (2.41) can be devided by the same side of the
second equation, respectively, leading to
(cosα⋆1 − cosβ⋆1) (s cos γ cosα⋆1 cosβ⋆1 + cosα⋆1 + cosβ⋆1 + s cos γ) = 0. (A.13)
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Note that solutions for (A.11) and (A.13) do not necessarily fulfill the first and the sec-
ond equations of (2.41), and we need to examine if they truly become the solutions by
substituting them into (2.41) under φ⋆ = ppi.
To proceed, we first seek solutions which satisfy cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1 . The solutions of
(A.11) and (A.13) are then
cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1 = s
r + (−)kr
r − (−)kr , kr = 0, 1. (A.14)
By substituting this to (2.41), we obtain kr = p. The solutions are available when the
condition |s r+(−)kr
r−(−)kr | ≤ 1 and the convexity condition (−)pa33 ≥ 0 are both met.
Secondly, if cosα⋆1 6= cosβ⋆1 , we consider the solutions separately depending on whether
s = (−)σ or not. If we have s = (−)σ, then (A.11) and (A.13) are combined as
cos γ cosα⋆1 cosβ
⋆
1 + (−)σ(cosα⋆1 + cosβ⋆1 ) + cos γ = 0. (A.15)
Thus, all pairs of α⋆1 and β
⋆
1 satisfying (A.15) become the solutions. By substituting them
to (2.41), we obtain p = 1, and we find the convexity condition a33 < 0. If s 6= (−)σ, then
(A.11) and (A.13) are rewritten as
α⋆1 =
pi
2
and cosβ⋆1 = −s cos γ. (A.16)
By substituting them to (2.41), we find p = 1 and s = (−)σ, contradicting the premise.
Thus, there are no solutions in this case.
Now, if we do not assume (A.12), then we have three possibilities. One of them is
cosα⋆1 = −s cos γ and β⋆1 =
pi
2
, (A.17)
which becomes a solution. By the similar substitution, we acquire p = 1 and s = (−)σ, and
the convexity condition is found to be a33 < 0. No other solutions appear in the remaining
possibilities.
(ii) For φ⋆ 6= ppi, (A.2) provides the solution for which the convexity condition is given in
Table I.
(IV-3) Maximally entangled states:
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Conditions Separable Generic Maximally entangled{
a33 = 0,
a30 = 0
∀α⋆1, ∀β⋆1 ∀α⋆1, ∀β⋆1 ∀α⋆1, ∀β⋆1{
a33 = 0,
a30 6= 0 α
⋆
1 = β
⋆
1 = 0, pi α
⋆
1 = β
⋆
1 = 0, pi ∀α⋆1, ∀β⋆1
{
a33 6= 0,
a30 = 0
sinα⋆1 = sinβ
⋆
1 = 0
cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1 = 0
sinα⋆1 = sinβ
⋆
1 = 0{
cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1 = 0,
φ⋆ = ppi
sinα⋆1 = sinβ
⋆
1 = 0{
α⋆1 = (−)pβ⋆1 + qpi,
φ⋆ = ppi
{
a33 < 0,
a30 = (−)σa33
sinα⋆1 = 0, ∀β⋆1
sinβ⋆1 = 0, ∀α⋆1
sinα⋆1 = sinβ
⋆
1 = 0

cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1
= s r+(−)
p
r−(−)p ,
φ⋆ = ppi

cos γ cosα⋆1 cosβ
⋆
1
+cos γ
+(−)σ(cosα⋆1 + cosβ⋆1)
= 0,
φ⋆ = pi
sinα⋆1 = sinβ
⋆
1 = 0{
α⋆1 = (−)pβ⋆1 + qpi,
φ⋆ = ppi
Otherwise
sinα⋆1 = sinβ
⋆
1 = 0{
cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1
= (−)c+1s
sinα⋆1 = sinβ
⋆
1 = 0

cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1
= s r+(−)
p
r−(−)p ,
φ⋆ = ppi
sinα⋆1 = sinβ
⋆
1 = 0{
α⋆1 = (−)pβ⋆1 + qpi,
φ⋆ = ppi
Table IV. Summary of the complete set of QNE. Here, c, p, q, and σ take values
0 or 1. The phase sum φ⋆ is not shown when it is undetermined (i.e., any value of
φ⋆ is a solution). The bottom row with the entry ‘Otherwise’ contains all cases of
a33 and a30 not included in the upper four rows.
Since (2.41) becomes (A.6), the solutions and their convexity conditions are the same
as those derived in (III-3).
Summary and regrouping of the solutions
The complete set of solutions (α⋆, β⋆) obtained above are summarized in Table IV
using trigonometric functions for brevity. These solutions can be regrouped into four
distinct types for the convenience of our discussions in the text.
Type I
(α⋆1, β
⋆
1) = (kα, kβ)pi, kα, kβ = 0, 1. (A.18)
These solutions arise in all of the above four classes.
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Type II
cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1 = s
r + (−)p
r − (−)p , φ
⋆ = ppi, p = 0, 1, (A.19)
At the separable limit, we have cosα⋆1 = cosβ
⋆
1 = ±s. If s = 0, then cosα⋆1 = cosβ⋆1 = 0.
Type III
cos γ cosα⋆1 cosβ
⋆
1 + (−)σ(cosα⋆1 + cosβ⋆1) + cos γ = 0, φ⋆ = pi, s = (−)σ. (A.20)
The separable limit yields sinα⋆1 = 0 or sinβ
⋆
1 = 0.
Type IV
α⋆1 = (−)pβ⋆1 + qpi, φ⋆ = ppi. (A.21)
This solution is available only when the joint strategy is maximally entangled, γ = pi/2.
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